Security Playbook of Digital Authoritarianism in Nigeria

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Harms from Abroad: Impact of Global Security Measures on Civic Space in Nigeria  

Summary of Key Findings

1. OVERSTRETCHING STATE POWER IN THE NAME OF COMBATING INSECURITY:   Combating the mounting insecurity in different parts of Nigeria, including terrorism in the north-east region, necessitated huge budgetary allocations to national security, accompanied by the massive procurement of sophisticated crime-fighting technologies and military equipment. State actors have taken advantage of their unfettered access to these financial resources and new technologies to either expand pre-existing policing powers or award themselves new surveillance powers.

2. DIVERSION OF THE SECURITY PARADIGM:  The huge budgetary allocations,  equipment, and technologies originally procured in the name of counterterrorism and curbing insecurity are being diverted to monitor the movement of citizens, to track activities of civic actors online, intercept private communications, restrict online civic space, and limit the ability of civic actors to organize, associate and assemble freely. The most popular tactics include the interception of private communications, network shutdowns, biometric data collection, seizure of  mobile phones and computers,  the use of forensic technology to extract and decode every ounce of data stored within digital devices, obtaining call records of individuals from network  providers without a judicial warrant, blocking  internet and website access through several technical protocols etc.

 3. PRIVATE COMPANIES AND FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIERS FACILITATING AND PROFITING FROM SECURITY-LINKED RESTRICTIONS: State actors could not have recorded considerable successes in their diversionary and restrictive adventures without the cooperation of telecommunication companies (Telcos), internet service providers (ISPs), content moderation platforms, private companies, including foreign suppliers of surveillance technologies and local as well as state regulatory agencies. With the limited checks and balances in place, surveillance capitalists and technology suppliers from Israel, United States and China are exploiting the misuse of the security architecture either for their corporate self-preservation or to make massive profits.

 4. SECURITY MEASURES COPIED FROM INTERNATIONAL NORMS CAUSING TENSION LOCALLY: Very clear links exist between many restrictions on the civic space in Nigeria and well-intentioned global initiatives developed in the context of countering terrorism (CT) and preserving national security. Nearly all the legal, institutional, and operational frameworks for combating terrorism and financing of terrorism in Nigeria are inspired or adapted from those that exist at the international CT levels, especially the standards and norms handed down by Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy. The military and non-military measures—mostly copied from abroad—deployed to combat numerous security threats in the country create opportunities for the use and abuse of counterterrorism (CT) and security laws, and this is potentially becoming the dominant driver of closing civic space in Nigeria.

 5. DRIVERS OF MISUSE: First, the absence of a clear definition of terrorism is a fatal flaw emanating from the founding counterterrorism instruments. This uncertainty is routinely exploited by governments to adopt overbroad. definitions that allows them to widen the dragnet to clamp down on real and perceived opposition and stifle dissent. Secondly, the consequences of non-compliance to international CT norms are dire, such as blacklisting, economic sanctions, low ratings during Mutual Evaluation and peer reviews exercises. Thirdly, International CT standards pay lip service to the tenets of human rights, and neither does the routinely cosmetic reference to human rights and humanitarian law translate into positive obligations for states.

 6. CIVIC ACTORS ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACTED BY THE MISUSE OF THE SECURITY RHETORIC: Incidents tracked on the Closing Spaces Database reveal that crackdowns on civic actors are usually linked to national security concerns or the enforcement of health emergency measures, or premised on the rhetoric of anti-money (AML) laundering and countering financing of terrorism. Civic actors most affected by the state’s arbitrary surveillance include journalists, protesters, LGBTQ activists and organizations, female activists and bloggers, persons with disabilities etc.

7. NPOS PAY A HEAVY PRICE FOR INCREASING SECURITIZATION: Although FATF’s Recommendation 8 has been revised, the nasty stains endure. Blanket generation, multiple registration controls, onerous reporting requirements, deregistration, forced closures, aggressive financial surveillance add to the list of heavy burdens NPOs are subjected to in the name of counterterrorism. Nigerian NPOs consider the recently-scheduled risk assessment of the NPO sector by the Special Control Unit against Money Laundering as a major opportunity to reverse these trends.

8. REFORM IS POSSIBLE, NECESSARY AND URGENT: Many steps need to be taken at the global and national levels to prevent the misuse of CT norms and security narratives for the suppression of civic freedoms. First is to push for an acceptable definition of terrorism. Definitions of terrorism and of violent extremism in national laws must not be overly-broad and vague. They must be precise and sufficiently clear to avoid including members of civil society, or non-violent acts carried out in the exercise of fundamental freedoms.